The Russia–Georgia War of 2008 (also known as the Five-Day War, 2008 South Ossetia Conflict or August War) was an armed conflict in August 2008 between Georgia on one side, and Russia and the separatist governments of South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the other.
The 1991–1992 South Ossetia War between ethnic Georgians and Ossetians had left slightly more than a half of South Ossetia under de facto control of a Russian-backed, internationally unrecognised government. Most ethnic Georgian parts of South Ossetia remained under the control of Georgia (Akhalgori district, and most villages surrounding Tskhinvali), with Georgian, North Ossetian and Russian Joint peacekeeping force present in the territories. A similar situation existed in Abkhazia after the War in Abkhazia (1992–1993). Increasing tensions escalated during the summer months of 2008. On August 5, a Russian spokesman said Russia would defend Russian citizens in South Ossetia if they were attacked.
During the night of 7 to 8 August 2008, Georgia launched a large-scale military offensive against South Ossetia, in an attempt to reclaim the territory. Georgia claimed that it was responding to attacks on its peacekeepers and villages in South Ossetia, and that Russia was moving non-peacekeeping units into the country. The Georgian attack caused casualties among Russian peacekeepers, who resisted the assault along with Ossetian militia. Georgia successfully captured most of Tskhinvali within hours. Russia reacted by deploying units of the Russian 58th Army and Russian Airborne Troops into South Ossetia one day later, and launching airstrikes against Georgian forces in South Ossetia and military and logistical targets in Georgia proper. Russia claimed these actions were a necessary humanitarian intervention and peace enforcement.
Russian and Ossetian forces battled Georgian forces throughout South Ossetia for four days, the heaviest fighting taking place in Tskhinvali. On 9 August Russian naval forces blockaded a part of the Georgian coast and landed marines on the Abkhaz coast. The Georgian Navy attempted to intervene, but was defeated in a naval skirmish. Russian and Abkhaz forces opened a second front by attacking the Kodori Gorge, held by Georgia. Georgian forces put up only minimal resistance, and Russian forces subsequently raided military bases in western Georgia. After five days of heavy fighting in South Ossetia, the Georgian forces retreated, enabling the Russians to enter uncontested Georgia and temporarily occupy the cities of Poti, Gori, Senaki, and Zugdidi.
Through mediation by the French presidency of the European Union, the parties reached a preliminary ceasefire agreement on 12 August, signed by Georgia on 15 August in Tbilisi and by Russia on 16 August in Moscow. Several weeks after signing the ceasefire agreement, Russia began pulling most of its troops out of uncontested Georgia. Russia established buffer zones around Abkhazia and South Ossetia and created checkpoints in Georgia's interior. These forces were eventually withdrawn from uncontested Georgia. However some Western officials insist the troops did not return to the line where they were stationed prior to the beginning of hostilities as described in the peace plan. Russian forces remain stationed in Abkhazia and South Ossetia under bilateral agreements with the corresponding governments.  A number of incidents occurred in both conflict zones in the months after the war ended




Priveous history

Before the break-up of the Soviet Union, South Ossetia operated as the South Ossetian AutonomousOblast, an autonomous region within the Georgian SSR. A military conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia broke out in January 1991 when Georgia sent troops to subdue a South Ossetian separatist movement. The separatists were helped by former Soviet military units, who by now had come under Russian command. Estimates of deaths in this fighting exceed 2,000 people. During the war several atrocities occurred on both sides. Approximately 100,000 Ossetians fled Georgia and South Ossetia, while 23,000 Georgians left South Ossetia.The war resulted in South Ossetia, which had a Georgian ethnic minority of around 29% of the total population of 98,500 in 1989, breaking away from Georgia and gaining de facto independence. After the Sochi agreement in 1992, Tskhinvali was isolated from the Georgian territory around it and Russian, Georgian and South Ossetian peacekeepers were stationed in South Ossetia under the Joint Control comission's (JCC) mandate of demilitarisation. The 1992 ceasefire also defined both a zone of conflict around the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali and a security corridor along the border of South Ossetian territories. This situation was mirrored in Abkhazia, an Autonomous Republic within Georgia in the USSR, where the Abkhazian minority seceded from Georgia in a War in the early 1990s. Similar to South Ossetia, most of Abkhazia was controlled by an unrecognised government, while Georgia controlled other parts. In May 2008, there were about 2,000 Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia, and about 1,000 Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia under the JCC's mandate.

The conflict remained frozen until 2003 when Mikheil Saakashvili came to power in Georgia's Rose Revolution, which ousted president Eduard Shevardnadze. In the years that followed, Saakashvili's government pushed a programme to strengthen failing state institutions, including security and military, created "passably democratic institutions" and implemented what many viewed as a pro-US foreign policy. One of Saakashvili's main goals has been Georgian NATO membership, which Russia opposes. This has been one of the main stumbling blocks in Georgia-Russia relations. In 2007, Georgia spent 6% of GDP on its military and had the highest average growth rate of military spending in the world. In 2008, Georgia's defence budget was $1bn, a third of all government spending. Restoring South Ossetia and Abkhazia to Georgian control has been seen as a top-priority goal of Saakashvili since he came to power. Opposition members have criticised Saakashvili of having authoritarian tendencies. During Saakashvili's rule, human rights organizations such as Freedom House downgraded Georgia's democracy ranking. The Freedom House ranking moved lower than it was under President Eduard Shevardnadze

Emboldened by the success in restoring control in Adiara in early 2004, the Georgian government launched a push to retake South Ossetia, sending 300 special task-force fighters into the territory. Georgia stated that the operation aimed to combat smuggling, but JCC participants branded the move as a breach of the Sochi agreement of 1992. Intense fighting took place between Georgian forces and South Ossetian militia between 8 and 19 August 2004. According to researcher Sergei Markedonov, the brief war in 2004 was a turning point for Russian policy in the region: Russia, which had previously aimed only to preserve the status-quo, now felt that the security of the whole Caucasus depended on the situation in South Ossetia, and took the side of South Ossetia. In 2006 Georgia sent police and security forces to the Kodori Gorge in eastern Abkhazia, when a local militia leader there had rebelled against the Georgian authorities. The presence of Georgian forces in the Kodori Gorge continued until the war in 2008.

Georgia accused Russia of the annexation of its internationally recognised territory and of installing a puppet government led by Eduard kokoity and by several officials who had previously served in the Russain FSB and in the Army From 2004 to 2008, Georgia has repeatedly proposed broad autonomy for Abkhazia and South Ossetia within the unified Georgian state, but the proposals have been rejected by the secessionist authorities, who demanded full independence for the territory. In 2006, the Georgian government set up what Russians said was a puppet government led by the former South Ossetian prime minister Dmitry Sanakovev and granted to it a status of a provisional administration, alarming Tskhinvali and Moscow. In what Sergei Markedonov has described as the culmination of Georgian "unfreezing" policy, the control of the Georgian peacekeeping battalion was transferred from the joint command of the peacekeeping forces to the Georgian Defence Ministry.

BTC pipline (green) and planned Nabucco gas pipeline (tangerine).

In 1989, Ossetians accounted for around 60 percent, Georgians 20 percent, Armenians 10 percent and Russians 5 percent of the population of South Ossetia. As of 2009 about 87.5% of the population of South Ossetia have acquired Russian citizenship, as a result of being Soviet Citizens (Russia extended citizenship to most USSR citizens, as it is internationally recognised as a successor state to the USSR). Additionally, 71% of all Ossetians were living in Russia, most of them just across the Roki Tunnel in North Ossetia, and had family members in South Ossetia. From the viewpoint of Russan constitutional law, the legal position of Russian passport holders in South Ossetia is the same as that of Russian citizens living in Russia.Russin PREsident Dmitry Medvedev stated that he would "protect the life and dignity of Russian citizens wherever they are" According to an EU report, this position is inconsistent with international law, which considers the vast majority of purportedly naturalised persons as not Russian citizens. According to Reuters, prior to the war Russia was supplying two thirds of South Ossetia's annual budget, and Russia's state-controlled gas giant Gazprom was building new gas pipelines and infrastructure worth hundreds of millions of dollars to supply South Ossetian cities with energy. Moreover, Russian officials already had de facto control over South Ossetia's institutions, including security institutions and security forces, and South Ossetia's de facto government was largely staffed with Russian representatives and South Ossetians with Russian passports who had previously worked in equivalent government positions in Russia. In mid-April, 2008, the Russian Foreign Ministry announced that Russian PM Vladimir putin had given instructions to the federal government whereby Russia would pursue economic, diplomatic, and administrative relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia as with the subjects of Russaia. When President Saakashvili was re-elected in early 2008, he promised to bring the breakaway regions back under Georgian control.

Although Georgia has no significant oil or gas reserves of its own, its territory hosts part of the important Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipline transit route that supplies western and central Europe. The pipeline, supplied by oil from Azerbaijan's Azeri-chirag-Guneshli oil field transports 1 million barrels (160,000 m³) of oil per day. It has been a key factor for the United States' support for Georgia, allowing the West to reduce its reliance on Middle Eastern oil while bypassing Russia and Iran.

The U.S Ambassador john tefft addresses Georgian graduates of the SSOP in June 2007.

Georgia maintained a close relationship with theG.W.Bush administration of the United States of America. In 2002, the USA started the Georgia train and Equip Program to arm and train the Georgian military, and, in 2005, a Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations program to broaden capabilities of the Georgian armed forces. These programmes involved training by the United States Army Special Forces,United States Marine Corps, and military advisors personnel.

 

Russia–Georgia war

Date	7–16 August 2008
Location	South Ossetia,Abkhazia, uncontested Georgia
	Russian/South Result:Ossetian/Abkhazian victory Recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent republics by Russia,Nicaragua.Venezuala,Nauru,Vanuatu, and Tuvalu. Expulsion of most ethnic Georgians from former South Ossetia AO and from the Kodori Gorge  Territorial changes

Commanders and Leaders

Georgia ‘ commanders

Russia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia commanders

1.Mikheil Saakashvili (commander-in-chief) 2.Lado Gurgenidze (Prime minister) 3.Davit Kezerashvili (Defence Minister)            4.Alexandre Lomaia (National Security Council) 5.Zaza Gogava (Chief of Joint Staff) 6.David Nairashvili (Air Force commander) 7.Mamuka Kurashvili (Peacekeepers) 8.Vano Merabishvili (Minister of Internal Affairs)

1. Dmitry Medvedev(commander-in-chief,Russia) 2.Anatoliv Serdyukov  (Defence Minister) (Russia) 3. Vladimir Boldvrev(Ground Forces) (Russia) 4.Anatoly khrulvov(58th army) (Russia) 5.Vyacheslav Bborisov(76th Airborne) (Russia) 6.marat kulakhmetov(peacekeepers) (Russia) 7.Sulim yamadayev(Vostok Battalion) (Russia) 8.Vladimir Shamnov(Russia) 9.Edurad Kokoity(commander-in-chief,South Ossetia) 10.Vasily lunev(Ministry of Defence,South Ossetia) 11.Anatoly Barankevich(Ministry of Defence and Emergencies,South Ossetia) 12.Taymuraz Mamsurov(commander-in-chief,South Ossetia) 13.Sergei Bagapsh((commander-in-chief) 14.Anatoly Zaitsev(Ministry of Defence)

 Result:

Georgia loses control over parts of Abkhazia (25%) and former South Ossetia AO (40%) it previously held. Around 20% of Georgia (including Abkhazia and South Ossetia) is no longer under government control.